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Supply Shock versus
Demand Shock 
The Local Efects of New Housing in Low-Income Areas 
Brian J. Asquith, Evan Mast, and Davin Reed 
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n  Policymakers worry that 
new market-rate apartment 
buildings in gentrifying 
neighborhoods could raise 
nearby rents and accelerate 
gentrification.
n  New buildings could 
change nearby amenities or 
neighborhood reputation, 
increasing demand for the 
neighborhood enough to offset 
the effect of increasing supply.
n  We test this hypothesis 
and find that new market-
rate apartment buildings in 
low-income central city areas 
instead slow rent increases.
n  New market-rate 
apartment buildings also 
increase the number of people 
migrating from other low-
income neighborhoods to the 
nearby area.
ALSO IN THIS ISSUE 
Effects of Unemployment 
Insurance Reforms
 in Brazil
Christopher J. O’Leary 
and Túlio Cravo
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Public frustration over escalating housing 
costs has steadily risen, particularly in large 
urban centers, as rents eat up an ever-larger 
portion of take-home pay. A commonly suggested 
solution is to allow developers to build more 
market-rate housing, which should lower rents 
by increasing supply. Previous research suggests 
that this will indeed reduce housing costs on 
average, but many think that this overall beneft 
comes with a signifcant cost—new development 
could raise rents in the immediately surrounding 
neighborhood.
Tis runs counter to standard economic 
models of supply and demand, but a slightly more 
complicated story could generate this result. Te 
story is particularly plausible in low-income or 
gentrifying neighborhoods. Because new units 
are typically expensive, they are usually flled by 
high-income households. Tese households could 
attract new stores, restaurants, or other amenities, 
and they could also signal that a neighborhood is 
changing in a way that is attractive to other high-
income households. If these amenity or reputation 
changes are large, they could increase demand for 
the neighborhood by enough to completely ofset 
the increase in supply, causing rents to increase and 
accelerating gentrifcation. 
Tis story has substantial infuence in the policy 
debate, leading many policymakers and residents 
to strongly oppose new market-rate housing 
developments in low-income areas. However, there 
is currently very little evidence for or against the 
idea. Our recent working paper flls the gap in 
knowledge by testing this theory directly. 
We fnd that new market-rate apartment 
buildings in low-income areas do not accelerate 
gentrifcation. Instead, they slow rent increases 
in nearby apartments and increase the number 
of people who move into the area from other 
low-income neighborhoods. Tus, the efect of 
new supply appears to outweigh any amenity 
or reputation improvements. Te latter may be 
small because new housing, even in currently 
low-income areas, goes into areas that are already 
gentrifying. Tis implies that new developments 
serve mainly to absorb existing demand for an area 
We fnd that new apartment
buildings in low-income areas
do not accelerate gentrifcation.
Instead, they slow rent increases in
nearby apartments and increase
migration from other low-income
neighborhoods.
rather than to generate new demand. In turn, this 
reduces pressures on nearby rents because many 
high-income households move to the new building 
rather than outbidding lower-income households 
for nearby apartments. 
Where Are New Apartment 
Buildings Constructed? 
We start with the most basic question: Where 
do developers build new market-rate apartments? 
We focus on a setting where the afordability crisis 
is worst, the housing debate is most contentious, 
and the amenities story is most plausible: large 
(50+) unit apartment buildings constructed in 
low-income, central city neighborhoods of major 
market cities between 2010 and 2019. Tese cities 
are Atlanta, Austin, Boston, Brooklyn, Chicago, 
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Table 1  Building Neighborhood Characteristics 
No building Some building 
Household income 
2000 ($) 47,190 44,998 
2010 ($) 45,097 48,181 
2017 ($) 47,129 63,771 
2000–2010 (%) −4.4 7.1 
2010–2017 (%) 4.5 32.4 
College degree (%) 
2000 18 33 
2010 23 44 
2017 27 55 
Number of tracts 2,459 1,094 
NOTE: Means of the characteristics of the neighborhoods (census tracts) which received new buildings or not. 
“Some building” column means are weighted by the number of buildings in each neighborhood. Samples 
of buildings and neighborhoods are described in detail in the working paper: https://research.upjohn.org/ 
up_workingpapers/316/. 
SOURCE: Real Capital Analytics, Census 2000 Long Form (“2000”), American Community Survey 2006–2010 5-Year 
Estimates (“2010”), and American Community Survey 2013–2017 5-Year Estimates (“2017”). 
Denver, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, 
Portland, San Francisco, and 
Washington, D.C. 
Table 1 compares low-income 
neighborhoods (defned as a census 
tract with median household income 
below the metropolitan area median) 
that received a new building to those 
that did not.1 Two striking patterns 
emerge. First, while 2010 household 
income is similar across the two 
groups, the areas that received a new 
building saw much larger increases in 
income during both the 2000–2010 
and 2010–2017 time period. Second, 
areas receiving construction had 
substantially higher levels of college 
education, which is ofen considered 
a leading indicator of gentrifcation. 
Tese patterns suggest that developers 
tend to target areas that are already 
changing, rather than attempting to 
kickstart gentrifcation in previously 
stable neighborhoods. 
In short, new developments are 
correlated with gentrifcation, but they 
follow it rather than precede it. Tis is 
likely because relatively high rents are 
necessary to make new construction 
feasible, so developers do not build in 
areas where they cannot charge those 
rents. Note that these patterns are 
specifc to large apartment buildings 
but may be diferent for other types of 
construction. 
How Do New Buildings Afect 
Nearby Rents? 
We then use data on individual rent 
listings provided by Zillow to assess the 
central question in the policy debate: 
Do new buildings in low-income areas 
increase rents? We focus on buildings 
built between 2015 and 2016 in order 
to be able to observe at least three years 
of data before and afer construction. 
Te major challenge to estimating 
causal efects is that new buildings 
are not randomly placed. Developers 
target areas where rent is rising fast 
and is expected to continue to rise in 
the future. Because of this, a simple 
comparison of rents in areas that did 
and did not get new construction 
(similar to our income comparison 
in Table 1) would likely show that 
rents increased by more near new 
buildings. However, this diference 
would not necessarily be caused by 
the new building. We use two quasi-
experiments to overcome this problem. 
First, we compare a treatment 
group very close to the new building 
(within 250 meters) to a control 
group slightly further away (between 
250 and 600 meters). Te idea is that 
while developers might well target a 
specifc neighborhood, they cannot 
choose exactly when and where to 
build because not every parcel is for 
sale or able to be developed. Tis 
means that within a small area, the 
exact placement of a new building 
is relatively random, making our 
treatment and control group close to 
identical except that the treatment 
group is closer to the new building. 
Tis strategy is good for picking up 
very local efects of new buildings, 
like new retail options or the aesthetic 
improvement of replacing a vacant lot. 
However, new buildings might have 
broader amenity or reputation efects 
that extend beyond that geographically 
small treatment and control group. 
To account for these, we construct a 
second “experiment.” We compare rents 
near sites developed in 2015–2016 
(our treatment group) to those near 
sites that were developed in 2019 (our 
control group). Te idea is that these 
two groups of sites are both appealing 
to developers but were not developed 
at the same time due to random delays 
in the land acquisition, fnancing, city 
approval, or construction processes. 
Because our treatment buildings are 
no longer in the same neighborhood 
as control buildings, we can detect 
changes in rents that are caused by 
efects that span a larger geography. 
Both approaches suggest that new 
buildings decrease rents by 5 to 7 
percent relative to what they otherwise 
would be. In both cases, we fnd that 
rents were following similar trends 
in the treatment and control groups 
before the buildings were completed, 
but rent increases slow sharply in 
the treatment areas immediately 
afer the buildings’ completion. Tis 
efect remains constant for the three 
postconstruction years that we can 
observe before our sample ends, and, 
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in a separate estimation, we fnd no 
evidence that efects change when we 
focus on earlier buildings and observe 
fve years afer completion. 
We note that this efect is relative to 
what rents would be had the building 
not been constructed—our fnding 
does not mean that rents decreased in 
absolute terms. Because our treatment 
areas are the places most likely to 
experience the positive amenity and 
reputation efects that could cause 
rents to increase, we take this as strong 
evidence that new buildings in low-
income areas decrease rather than 
increase rents. 
Do New Buildings Afect Who Moves 
into the Surrounding Neighborhood? 
Last, we study how a new 
development changes in-migration 
to the surrounding neighborhood 
(excluding the new building itself). We 
do so using address history data from 
Infutor Data Solutions, a marketing 
intelligence company. Te data do not 
include information on individuals’ 
incomes, so we instead construct 
outcomes using the average income in 
migrants’ origin neighborhoods. 
Figure 1 shows trends in the 
number of high-income arrivals within 
250 meters of buildings completed 
in 2014 or 2015 in a low-income 
neighborhood.2 We defne high-income 
movers as those who moved from a 
we repeat the quasi-experiments that 
we used to study rent but instead use 
the origin neighborhood income of 
in-migrants as the outcome. We fnd 
that new buildings increase the number 
of arrivals from neighborhoods with 
average income below two-thirds 
of the metropolitan area median by 
three percentage points and reduce 
average origin income by a similar 
amount. Te increase in low-income 
arrivals implies that new buildings 
also decrease rents for relatively cheap 
units, not just the expensive units that 
are their most direct competitors. More 
directly, the new buildings appear to 
allow more low-income households to 
move to these frequently gentrifying 
neighborhoods. 
Policy Implications 
Te housing approval process in 
low-income and gentrifying areas is 
contentious, ofen because of concerns 
that new buildings will accelerate rent 
increases and neighborhood change. 
Our evidence suggests that this is 
typically not the case. Instead, new 
buildings slow nearby rent increases 
and increase the ability of individuals 
from low-income neighborhoods 
to move to the nearby area. While 
the neighborhoods containing new 
buildings do gain richer residents, 
the gain is concentrated in the new 
building. Tis efectively diverts high-
income individuals from outbidding 
low-income individuals for units in the 
nearby preexisting buildings. Te new 
housing thus helps absorb the pressure 
from the increasing number of high-
income individuals that want to live in 
central city neighborhoods. Moreover, 
by allowing more low-income 
households to move to an area, new 
housing helps these rapidly changing 
neighborhoods remain economically 
integrated, which research suggests 
promotes economic mobility for low-
income residents. 
Figure 1  In-Migration to Areas around New Buildings 
60 
50 
40 
Total within 250m 
Nonbuilding within 250m 
Building migrants 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
neighborhood with income above 
the metropolitan median. As shown 
in the black line, the total number of 
high-income arrivals does increase by 
about 20 percent following a building’s 
completion. However, this increase 
is entirely driven by arrivals to the 
Ar
riv
al
s 
30 
20 
10
new building itself (the red line). Te 
blue line, which shows the number of 
arrivals to the area within 250 meters 0 
excluding the new building, remains fat 
or declines slightly afer construction. 
While this suggests that a new 
building does not drastically change NOTE: This fgure shows trends in the number of in-migrants from tracts with income above the MSA-median to 
the area within 250 meters of new buildings. Nonbuilding migrants are those arriving to the area within 250 in-migration to a neighborhood, it does 
meters but not the new building, building migrants are arrivals to the new building itself, and total migrants is not provide causal evidence on the the sum. The sample includes 2011–2017 moves within 250 meters of new buildings completed in 2014–2015. 
building’s efect. In our fnal exercise, SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from Infutor Data Solutions and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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On the whole, new market-rate 
housing appears to beneft not just the 
region but also the local neighborhood. 
Tis suggests that market-rate housing 
should be an important part of any 
solution to the housing afordability 
crisis. Fears of increased rents near 
new buildings should not prevent 
governments from implementing 
desired reforms to regional housing 
supply.
We note two important caveats 
to our fndings. First, we estimate 
an average efect that may disguise 
variation across diferent types 
of buildings and neighborhoods. 
Amenity and reputation efects are 
highly subjective and may vary widely 
depending on the local context. 
Second, the buildings in our sample are 
in the types of places that developers 
historically have wanted to build. 
While these areas are central to the 
debate, the efects may be diferent 
in other types of neighborhoods. 
For example, developers rarely build 
market-rate units in very low-income 
areas with high vacancy rates, so our 
results do not speak to what would 
happen if they did. 
Notes 
1. A census tract is an area with about 
4,000 people. 
2. Our migration data contain one less 
year than our rent data, so we shif the 
buildings we study back by one year. 
This article draws on research form an Upjohn Institute
working paper, which can be found at https://research
.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/316/. 
Brian J. Asquith and Evan Mast are economists at
the Upjohn Institute. David Reed  is a community
development economic advisor at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
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Efects of
Unemployment Insurance
Reforms in Brazil 
Christopher J. O’Leary, Túlio Cravo, Ana Cristina Sierra, and Leandro Justino Veloso 
Te Brazilian unemployment 
insurance (UI) program was 
established in response to a severe 
economic recession in the 1980s. It 
is now the largest UI program in the 
Latin America and Caribbean region, 
with more than 40 million benefciaries 
between 2012 and 2016. Despite its 
size, the program operates in a labor 
market where more than one-third of 
all employees work in informal jobs 
not covered by UI. Because these latter 
workers receive no benefts when they 
are separated from their jobs, formal 
sector employment is desirable, and 
previous research has found signifcant 
fows of workers between the formal 
and informal sectors and back again, 
which UI receipt may facilitate. In 
particular, some employers may use UI 
to subsidize wages of workers they lay 
of and then recall afer UI benefts end. 
Some laid-of employees even continue 
to work informally in their prior 
jobs while receiving UI benefts (Van 
Doornik, Schoenherr, and Skrastins 
2017). Moreover, the UI program has 
historically been generous in terms 
of minimal eligibility requirements 
within the formal sector, which could 
further incentivize such back-and-
forth fows. 
Tese features have made Brazil’s UI 
program relatively expensive, and when 
a recession in 2014 further increased 
costs, the Brazilian government 
instituted reforms in the eligibility rules 
to contain future costs. We investigate 
the efects of two such changes in UI 
eligibility rules in 2015 that increased 
the work experience requirements for 
frst- and second-time UI applicants. 
While previous research estimated that 
these reforms signifcantly reduced 
layofs (Carvalho, Corbi, and Narita 
2018), our analysis, which relies on 
more complete administrative records, 
fnds smaller overall reductions in 
layofs, with somewhat larger decreases 
for workers with a single prior UI 
beneft spell. 
A Natural Experiment 
Te recession that began in early 
2014, coupled with the institutional 
features of Brazil’s UI program 
described above, led to calls for 
reforming the system. Facing general 
budget difculties and anticipating 
a signifcant rise in unemployment, 
Brazilian President Dilma Roussef 
issued Provisional Measure 665 in late 
December of 2014, raising UI eligibility 
requirements for frst and second 
time UI claimants, efective March 1, 
2015. Soon thereafer, the legislature 
passed a new law codifying eligibility 
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n The Brazilian unemployment insurance (UI) program, established in 1990, is now 
the largest in Latin America.
n UI reforms in 2015 increased work experience eligibility requirements for first- and 
second-time UI applicants.
n We find reductions in layoffs are greater for workers with one prior UI spell than 
for first-time claimants.
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rules nearly as strict as the provisional 
measure, and this law took efect on 
June 17, 2015. Brazil thus experienced 
two sudden changes in UI eligibility 
rules in 2015, although these changes 
applied only for workers on their frst 
or second UI application; rules for the 
third and subsequent applications were 
unchanged. Consequently, the reforms 
were targeted toward recent labor 
market entrants. 
Specifcally, the reforms increased 
the minimum number of months of 
employment workers needed before 
they would qualify for the shortest 
beneft duration on their frst or 
second UI application. Prior to the 
frst reform, any UI applicant who had 
worked six months in the prior three 
years could qualify for three months of 
benefts (frst row of Table 1). Under 
both reforms, frst- and second-time 
UI applicants now needed longer 
recent work experience to qualify for 
the shortest potential beneft duration. 
For frst-time claimants, for example, 
the new minimum potential beneft 
shifed from three to four months, but 
the required work period increased 
from 12 to 18 months under the frst 
reform, before returning to 12 months 
under the second reform, a mere four 
months later. A summary of the work 
requirements for UI beneft eligibility 
under each set of eligibility rules is 
listed in the Table 1. 
Our evaluation focuses on short-
tenure workers who were most afected 
by the changes in UI eligibility rules. 
Using data that contains tenure at the 
daily level, we contrast job layof rates 
for a treatment group of workers with 
at least 6 and less than 7 months of 
job tenure against a control group of 
workers with at least 5 and less than 6 
months of job tenure. Under the initial 
regime, the treatment group with 6 
months of job tenure was eligible for 
three months of UI benefts but frst- 
and second-time applicants became 
ineligible for any benefts under both 
reforms. We estimate how diferences 
in layof risk between the treatment 
and control groups vary across the 
diferent regimes, an approach called 
diference-in-diferences. To isolate 
the impact of the reforms, we further 
adjust for diferences across individuals 
in their geographic location, calendar 
month in the data, and demographic 
characteristics. 
Efects on Layofs 
We fnd that the increase in work 
months needed for UI eligibility 
reduced employer layofs. For short-
tenure workers with no prior UI 
applications, the frst reform reduced 
layof risk by 0.18 percentage points 
(from a base layof rate of 3.4 percent). 
Te impact of the second reform 
was larger, cutting layof risk by 0.41 
percentage points relative to the period 
before either reform. 
Among workers who had one prior 
UI application, the reforms had even 
stronger impacts, with the frst reform 
reducing layof risk by 0.9 percentage 
points (from a base layof rate of 4.0 
percent), and the second reform by 
1.05 percentage points. 
While sizable, these efects are 
smaller than those implied by earlier 
studies that did not have as detailed 
data on the number of prior UI 
applications. When we approximate the 
methodology of previous studies by not 
accounting for the number of prior UI 
spells, we estimate a layof reduction 
from the frst reform of 0.35 percentage 
points, much smaller than earlier 
Program costs rose sharply with the
recession starting in 2014 as more
unemployed workers with sufcient
experience drew UI benefts. 
estimates of 0.53 percentage points 
(Van Doornik et al. 2018) to 0.69 
percentage points (Carvalho, Corbi, 
and Narita 2018). 
Reduction in Collusion 
In the United States, UI benefts are 
fnanced by experience-rated employer 
taxes that rise with total benefts paid 
to an employer’s former workers. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, layofs are 
lower in states where UI taxes rise more 
quickly with experience-rating (Card 
and Levine 1994). In contrast, Brazilian 
UI benefts are fnanced from general 
revenues, and neither employers nor 
workers pay specifc taxes to fnance 
the program. Consistent with this lack 
of implicit penalty for heavily using the 
system, Brazilian UI benefts appear to 
subsidize the fow between low-wage, 
short-term jobs and informal sector 
Table 1  Months of Employment Required for UI Benefts, 1990–2017 
Number of 
UI claim 
Potential 
beneft duration 
Initial regime 
(1990 to Feb. 27, 
2015) 
Reform 1 
(Feb. 28, 2015 to 
June 16, 2015) 
Reform 2 
(from June 17, 2015) 
First Three 6 —  — 
Four 12 18 12 
Five 24 24 24 
Second Three 6 —  9 
Four 12 12 12 
Five 24 24 24 
Third or more Three 6 6 6 
Four 12 12 12 
Five 24 24 24 
NOTE: The table shows the number of months of formal employment required in the 36 months before UI 
application to be eligible for benefts, by number of UI claims and regime. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from provisions in Law 7.998, PM 665, and Law 13.134. 
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Figure 1  Both Eligibility Reforms Reduced the Risk of Layofs layofs. However, our results indicate 
that previous studies overestimated 
Zero prior claims One prior claim these reductions, likely because they 
were unable to precisely measure 
individuals’ prior UI requests, a key 
parameter undergirding the changes 
in requirements. When we account for 
prior UI requests, we fnd that changes 
in UI eligibility rules reduced the 
chance of layof the most for workers 
with exactly one prior UI beneft 
receipt spell. Our results provide 
some evidence that restrictions on UI 
eligibility reduced collusion between 
workers and employers using UI − 1 
− 0.8 
− 0.6 
− 0.4 
− 0.2 
0 
Im
pa
ct
 on
 p
ro
ba
bi
lit
y o
f l
ay
oﬀ
 s 
− 0.40 
− 0.18 
− 0.90 Reform 1 
Reform 2 
− 1.05 benefts to subsidize wages. 
− 1.2 
REFERENCES 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. 
jobs, in some cases back and forth 
with the same employer (Doornik, 
Schoenherr, and Skrastins 2017). 
We fnd the eligibility reforms 
afected this behavior, too. For short-
tenure workers with no prior UI claims, 
the probability of being rehired by the 
same employer within 4 to 10 months 
of layof fell by 1.3 percentage points 
afer the frst reform and 1.8 percentage 
points afer the second reform. For 
short-tenure workers with one prior UI 
claim, the frst reform reduced recall to 
the same employer by 1.7 percentage 
points, an amount similar to workers 
with no prior UI claims. However, the 
second reform did not appear to afect 
recalls for these workers. 
Conclusion 
We confrm results of previous 
research that Brazil’s 2015 increases 
in UI eligibility requirements reduced 
Figure 2  Both Eligibility Reforms Also Reduced Job Recall to the Same Employer 
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This article draws on research form an Upjohn Institute
working paper, which can be found at https://research
.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/318/. 
Christopher J. O’Leary is a senior economist at the
Upjohn Institute, and Túlio Cravo is a principal
economist at the African Development Bank. Ana
Cristina Sierra and Leandro Justino Veloso are
consultants to the Inter-American Development
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. Bank. 
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New and Recent Books from Upjohn Press 
Pathways to Careers
in Health Care 
Christopher T. King and 
Philip Young P. Hong, Editors 
In 2009, at the time when Congress passed the 
Afordable Care Act (ACA), the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics projected that over the next 10 years, 
the health care and 
social assistance 
sector would gain 
5.6 million jobs, 
outpacing all other 
occupation groups. 
This job growth 
corresponds to our 
increasing demand 
for health care 
resulting mainly 
from our aging population. To help meet this 
growing demand for workers, Congress included 
in the ACA Health Professions Opportunity 
Grants (HPOG), a demonstration program 
within the Department of Health and Human 
Services established to provide health care career 
opportunities for disadvantaged populations. 
As the editors point out, “HPOG unites two 
important innovations in workforce development 
programming for serving low-income populations 
in recent decades, career pathways and sector 
strategies, by actively fostering the use of the 
former in the context of one major sector— 
health care.” 
This book presents a wide-ranging look at HPOG 
and innovative support programs which are both 
aimed at not only facilitating career pathways to 
the health care feld for low-income individuals, 
but also helping to meet the growing demand for 
health care workers. 
December 2019. 408 pp. 
$35 paper 978-0-88099-666-2 
Download the frst chapter for free at https:// 
research.upjohn.org/up_press/259/. 
Making Sense
of Incentives 
Taming Business Incentives 
to Promote Prosperity 
Timothy J. Bartik 
“With this book, Tim Bartik has solidifed his 
rank as the leading, trusted expert on economic 
development 
incentives 
and economic 
development broadly. 
The role of frm-
based incentives has 
triggered passionate 
debate, and Bartik 
responds with rigor, 
reason, and realism. 
I hope readers heed 
the call for needed reforms recommended in 
this timely book.”—Amy Liu, vice president and 
director, Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program 
“Economic development incentives are one of 
the biggest boondoggles of our time, draining 
away tens of billions of dollars of precious 
taxpayer dollars, with some states and cities 
ofering as much as $7 billion to lure Amazon’s 
much-ballyhooed HQ2. No one understands 
the intricacies of economic development 
incentives—what works and what does not— 
and the broader feld of economic development 
policy and strategy better than Tim Bartik. 
This book is an absolute must read for mayors, 
governors, economic developers, city-builders, 
CEOs and business executives, community 
activists, and all those concerned about the future 
of our cities and communities.”—Richard Florida, 
author of The Rise of the Creative Class, and 
University Professor at the University of Toronto 
October 2019. 178 pp. 
$14.99 pbk ISBN 978-0-88099-668-6 
PDF is free at https://research WE focus 
.upjohn.org/up_press/258/. series 
Strengths of the
Social Safety Net in
the Great Recession 
Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance and 
Unemployment Insurance 
Christopher J. O’Leary, David Stevens, Stephen A. 
Wandner, and Michael Wiseman, Editors 
The impacts of the Great Recession greatly 
tested the nation’s social safety net. During 
this monumental 
economic downturn, 
the number of 
Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) 
recipients doubled 
from 10 million to 
20 million, and the 
number receiving 
benefts through 
the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) ballooned 
from 20 million to 50 million. Many who lost 
their jobs became eligible for UI and often SNAP, 
too. Many already receiving SNAP lost jobs and 
became eligible for UI. While both programs were 
stressed, they proved to be fexible enough to 
respond to the needs of many of the victims of the 
recession. But little has been known about how 
the two programs interacted and how policies 
governing them may be altered to better respond 
to hardship when future downturns occur. 
This book shows that each program has 
considerable efects on the other and how policies 
governing them could be altered to better serve 
recipients of both programs. 
July 2019. 430 pp. 
$30.00 pbk ISBN 978-0-88099-663-1 
PDF is free at https://research.upjohn.org/ 
up_press/257/. 
7 
Nonproft Org. 
U.S. POSTAGE 
300 S. Westnedge Avenue PAID Kalamazoo MI Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686 Permit No. 756 
Connect with us 
WEBSITE
W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research @UpjohnInstitute 
INSTITUTIONAL 
REPOSITORY upjohn.org research.upjohn.org 
Vol. 27, No. 1 The Institute is a nonproft, independent research W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
Employment Research is published quarterly by organization devoted to fnding and promoting solutions to 300 S. Westnedge Avenue, Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. employment-related problems at the international, national, (269) 343-5541 • www.upjohn.org 
Issues appear in January, April, July, and October. state, and local levels. Michael W. Horrigan, President 
